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Shoring Up the Limits of Rhode
Island's Public Trust Doctrine:
Greater Providence Chamber of
Commerce v. State of Rhode
Island Makes it Simple as
One, Two, Fee
INTRODUCTION
Most people think of coasts as fixed, enduring boundaries
that mark the land's end. Yet all coasts are constantly chang-
ing in an endless battle with the ocean.
Since ancient times, people have found food and hospita-
ble climates along coasts. Throughout history, coasts have
been gateways to exploration, trade, and settlement. Most of
the world's major cities lie along seacoasts or along rivers
leading to coasts.'
In addition to the natural forces of water, ice, wind and gravity
changing the features of coastlines, people also have a dramatic
effect on the coasts: more than half of the people in the United
States live in coastal counties.2 Between 1960 and 1990, coastal
population density increased from 106 to 152 people per square
mile. 3 Twelve of the first thirteen states were founded along the
Atlantic coast, and today nearly one quarter of the population (60
million people) lives in coastal counties along the Atlantic Ocean.4
The benefits associated with water access and the metaphysical at-
traction to water's inherent beauty are likely the forces creating
1. The Special Publications Division, The National Geographic Society, Ex-
ploring Your World: The Adventure of Geography 122 (rev. 1993).
2. Coastal Living: For Majority of U.S., It's Home, Population Today, July/
August 1993, at 4. The current definition of a coastal county, consistent with the
one used by the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, is a county with
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this gravitation toward coasts. But as the private interests en-
croach upon the water's natural boundaries, the public interest in
the natural resource is undermined.
Since the early 1970s, society has gained a heightened aware-
ness of the adverse impacts of environmental degradation and ex-
ploitation.5 This has translated into increased efforts to conserve
water and shorelines in their pristine state.6
While land of the type found under bays may not be a particu-
larly limited natural resource, the navigable waters of a bay
are limited .... This scarcity is critical to the special impor-
tance of the lands under or along the edges of those navigable
waters and justifies the development of a unique regime of
public property rights to protect them. 7
In their capacity as promoters and preservers of the public in-
terest, legislatures and courts play an active role to curtail private
interests that impinge on the public's right to enjoy natural re-
sources.8 This idea stems from "a belief that the public benefits
mightily from private development, but that the public interest is
in fact greater than the sum of the private interests."9 When pri-
vate interests conflict with and are outweighed by the public inter-
est, the government needs a mechanism for defending the public
interest.
The public trust doctrine is an ancient weapon wielded by gov-
ernments to defend public interest from private usurpations of the
world's most essential natural resource: water.' 0 Simply stated,
the public trust doctrine provides that submerged and submersible
lands are preserved for public use in navigation, fishing or recrea-
5. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sover-
eignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L.
Rev. 631 (1986); Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J.
Envtl. L. & Litig. 107 (1986).
6. See Lazarus, supra note 5; Reed, supra note 5.
7. Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of Amer-
ican Property Law, 19 Envtl. L. 515, 517 (1989).
8. For an extensive discussion of the role of the judiciary and its interplay
with the legislature in developing public trust law, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich.
L. Rev. 471 (1970).
9. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 425, 471 (1989).
10. George J. Demko et al., Why in the World: Adventures in Geography 160
(1992) ("absolutely essential to all life.... Water is life, wealth, and power. It is
far more rare, vulnerable, and precious than oil.").
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tion, and the state, as trustee, bears the responsibility and pos-
sesses the authority to preserve and to protect the use of the
waters for those purposes. 1 ' The public trust doctrine can be
traced back to the Justinian Institutes of Roman Law, where it is
written "they (the shores) cannot be said to belong to anyone as
private property."12 At common law, the King was considered to
hold title to all lands beneath the sea' 3 and all lands subject to
tidal flows' 4 for the benefit of his subjects. This common law doc-
trine has a vast history and is firmly infused in American
jurisprudence. 15
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,16 the "lodestar case" 17 on
public trust in the United States and the state of Rhode Island,,,
delineates the three rights paramount to state retention of the title
to submerged lands: "It is a title held in trust for the people of the
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from
the obstruction or interference of private parties."' 9 This triad,
navigation, commerce and fishing, provides the basis for the tradi-
11. Black's Law Dictionary 1232 (6th ed. 1990).
12. J. Inst. 2.1.1-2.1.6.
13. Several jurisdictions have puzzled over whether the sea or waterway must
be navigable in order to be subject to the public trust. This issue has not been
addressed in Rhode Island and will receive no further discussion here. For a re-
cent decision on the issue see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
476 (1988) (reaffirming longstanding precedent that the doctrine's applicability is
based upon a state's "ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide") (emphasis added).
14. Many cases in various jurisdictions, including Rhode Island, have revolved
around the delineation of land subject to tidal flows. Alternatives chosen for de-
marcation range from the high water mark to the low water mark and several
points in between, such as mean high tide or a mathematic determination attained
by complex scientific formulas. See generally Alfred A. Porro, Jr. & Lorraine S.
Teleky, Marshland Tidal Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 323
(1972). Rhode Island has chosen mean high tide ("high water mark" is used inter-
changeably) as the decisive line. See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982)
(discussing the meaning of "high water mark" and "mean high tide"). These dis-
tinctions, however, are not pertinent to the present discussion, so they will receive
no further discussion here.
15. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illi-
nois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
16. 146 U.S. 387.
17. Sax, supra note 8, at 489.
18. See, e.g., Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991); City of Providence
v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906).
19. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
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tional doctrine. "For each category, the essence of the public use is
related to the navigable water, not to the land under or alongside
it.,,20
In the last twenty five years an increased number of litigants
and courts have relied on the public trust doctrine, 21 and many
jurisdictions have extended the public uses covered by the trust.2 2
Yet, until a state affirmatively augments the scope of the doctrine,
navigation, commerce and fishing remain the essential rights pro-
tected by traditional public trust precepts.
Historically, Rhode Island has consistently adhered to the
traditional public trust doctrine. 23 The three traditional precepts
have been articulated by state common law and have provided the
fulcrum upon which to balance the public and private interests in
filled tidal lands. This treatment of the public trust which has re-
peatedly acknowledged the potentially paramount rights of private
landowners in submerged lands was dramatically altered when the
Rhode Island Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hall v. Nas-
cimento24 in 1991. In a few paragraphs, the court aggrandized the
influence of the public trust and held that private rights are "sub-
servient" to public interests. 25 Hall spurned confusion over the
balance between public and private interests in tidal lands and it
left private landowners to hypothesize whether they could ever ac-
quire fee simple absolute by extinguishing the public trust. The
obfuscation and uncertainty that Hall injected into the sphere of
public trust was not left unresolved for long.
In direct response to the decision in Hall, four parties sought a
declaratory judgment to determine the extent and vitality of Rhode
Island's version of the public trust doctrine, and its specific effect
20. Dunning, supra note 7, at 518. See also Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (em-
phasizing the importance of navigability as the crucial factor).
21. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 644-47.
22. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 649-50 (listing the expanded uses which in-
clude beaches, parklands, battlefields and cemeteries).
23. See, e.g., Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991) (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); State v. Ibbison, 448
A.2d 728, 731 (R.I. 1982) (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842)); City of
Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906) (citing Shively, 152 U.S. 1; Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. 387).
24. 594 A.2d 874.
25. Id. at 877.
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on the plaintiffs' parcels.26 In the resulting case of Greater Provi-
dence Chamber of Commerce v. State,27 the supreme court clarified
the scope of public trust in Rhode Island. The court limited its
holding to reflect the reluctance to cast off traditional public trust
restraints idly, but the court also announced a test 28 for establish-
ing ownership rights in filled tidal lands.
The Chamber of Commerce decision gathers lines of reasoning
from the dicta and holdings of previous Rhode Island public trust
cases and uses them to tie a strong slipknot. The slipknot is the
two-part test for evaluating public trust cases in this state. It is
strong because it brings together various historical lines of reason-
ing and uses them to form a consistent modern doctrine. It is a
slipknot because the test is flexible enough to expand or constrict
its impact based on the given parcel of land.
This Comment will present the evolution of Rhode Island's
public trust doctrine and the various factors supporting the inno-
vative solution announced in Chamber of Commerce. Part I begins
with a discussion of the origin of public trust law in the United
States and demonstrates that it is largely a body of law subject to
state control. Part I then examines the physical and legal charac-
teristics unique to Rhode Island that have shaped Rhode Island's
embodiment of the public trust doctrine. Part I concludes with a
critique of Hall v. Nascimento,29 the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land opinion that marked a departure from then existing law and
precipitated the declaratory judgment action brought in Chamber
of Commerce. Part II presents the facts and procedural history of
Chamber of Commerce. Part III analyzes the court's treatment of
the plaintiffs' parcels in Chamber of Commerce, shows how the
treatment of these parcels led to the creation of the test, and ar-
gues that the announced test is a cogent clarification of Rhode Is-
land common law. Part III also includes a study of the
contemporary movement in some states to limit the scope of the
public trust doctrine. The states discussed will identify vindicat-
ing policy concerns underlying the Chamber of Commerce test
which now circumscribes the sphere of public trust in Rhode Is-
26. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1039
(R.I. 1995).
27. Id.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
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land. The conclusion summarizes the outcomes produced by the
test and projects the practical effects of the test.
I. TRADITIONAL PUBLIC TRUST THEORY AND ITS TREATMENT IN
RHODE ISLAND
A. States May Individualize the Universal Concepts
When America gained its independence in 1776, the colonies
adopted the common law of England and government control over
submerged lands was thereby vested in the thirteen original colo-
nies.30 By this time, Rhode Island was already operating under a
theory of public trust because, as early as 1707, the Rhode Island
General Assembly had passed a resolution granting to the towns
the "full power and authority to settle such coves, creeks, rivers,
waters, [sic] banks bordering upon their respective townships, as
they shall think fit for the promotion of their several towns ....- 31
In the authoritative early cases on public trust in the United
States, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois32 and Shively v.
Bowlby,33 the Supreme Court held that each state is sovereign over
the tidal lands within its respective borders and that within consti-
tutional limits, each state is allowed to determine the scope and
particulars of the doctrine's applicability because there is no uni-
versal law of public trust.3 4 Thus, states have broad discretion to
develop their own individual bodies of public trust law.
Despite this discretion, "nieither the Supreme Court nor any
state courts have disavowed the prohibition of 'substantial impair-
ment' of public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing an-
nounced in Illinois Central and Shively."35 States have fashioned
their own interpretations of the public trust, but all within the lati-
tude granted by this general standard.36 A 1981 advisory opinion
30. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). As other states were admitted into
the union, they were given equal footing with the existing states, and thus at-
tained the same status as sovereign in control of the tide lands. See Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
31. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Horgan, 56 A. 179, 181 (R.I. 1903) (citing 4
Col. Rec. 24 (1707)).
32. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
33. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
34. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387; Shively, 152 U.S. 1.
35. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 463-64.
36. Id. at 464.
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from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court3 7 stated, "[tihe
general view in this country is that constitutional considerations
do not bar legislative grants of absolute rights in submerged lands,
although a gross or egregious disregard of the public interest
would not survive constitutional challenge."38 Therefore, the gen-
eral conceptions of the doctrine are universal and constitutionally
mandated, but the particular applications are determined by each
individual state. The characteristics and customs peculiar to each
state should be the formative elements of that state's public trust
law.3 9
B. The Rhode Island Approach
An analysis of three characteristics peculiar to Rhode Island
elucidates the diacritical factors of Rhode Island's public trust law.
The state's distinguished constitution, differentiating geography,
and distinct common law are the three areas that comprise the
formative elements of Rhode Island's approach.
1. The Rhode Island Constitution
One could seek out the work of cartoonist Don Bousquet for a
witty exploration of the eccentricities of Rhode Islanders and their
bizarre relationship with Narragansett Bay,40 but for an authori-
tative legal source one need look no further than the text of the
state constitution:
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the
rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which they
have been heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of
this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore,
the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea
and passage along the shore; and they shall be secure in their
rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of
the state with due regard for the preservation of their values;
37. Opinion of Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981).
38. Id. at 1099. An example of a grant that did not survive constitutional
challenge is the grant in Illinois Central. In that case the grant failed because the
state conveyed nearly the entire waterfront of Chicago, over 1,000 acres, to a pri-
vate railroad, completely cutting off public access to Lake Michigan. Illinois Cen-
tral, 146 U.S. 387.
39. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
40. See generally Don Bousquet, Quahog State of Mind (1995); Don Bousquet,
The Quahog Stops Here (1992).
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and it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for
the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, min-
eral and other natural resources of the state .... *41
This section of the constitution is illustrative of the Rhode Island
view of public trust for three reasons. First, while it does make
explicit some protected rights of the public to the shore, it does not
expand the rights as they existed at common law.4 2 This limita-
tion is clear from the characterization that the people shall con-
tinue to enjoy the rights they have been entitled to under the
charter and usages of the state.43 The latter part of this phrase
also contains the second important guide to the Rhode Island ap-
proach: "usages of this state."44 The people of the state have be-
come accustomed to certain usages stemming from an accepted
interpretation of the rights traditionally protected, and this consti-
tutional provision recognizes the importance of those usages. 45
Thirdly, this section expressly guarantees one extraordinary right:
the right to gather seaweed. 46 Collecting thalassic algae may be a
privilege in need of protection, but affording it express constitu-
tional protection is clearly atypical from other states. Since this
right is not an expansion of the uses traditionally protected,47 it is
merely an explicit statement of Rhode Island's broad interpreta-
tion of a right traditionally protected, fishing. 48 Therefore, by rati-
fying this provision, the legislature has not expanded the rights
protected by the trust. This section of the constitution serves only
to clarify some of the unusual interests consistently protected in
41. R.I. Const. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added).
42. R.I. Const. art. I, § 17, n.1, "Construction and Purpose" (citing State v.
Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855) ("This section neither grants nor takes away rights of
fishery and privileges of the shore but leaves such rights unaffected . ")). See
Clark v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763, 765 (1888) ("It is clear that this section
[Article I, Section 17] leaves the rights of the people as they existed previously to
the constitution.").
43. R.I. Const. art. I, § 17.
44. Id.
45. See discussion infra pp. 193-94.
46. R.I. Const. art. I, § 17.
47. See Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901) (affirming right to collect sea-
weed on the shore).
48. For other cases broadly interpreting the right of "fishing", see Allen v. Al-
len, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895) (noting accepted right to take shellfish from the waters
and the shore below high water mark); Clarke v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763, 766
(R.I. 1888) (acknowledging the right to clam by saying, "[i]t is common knowledge
that the citizens of the state have always been accustomed to dig clams freely
along the shores of the bay and river . . ").
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Rhode Island because of the state's unique relationship with the
water.
2. State Geography
The citizens of Rhode Island have a special relationship with
Narragansett Bay because of the bay's geographical prominence.
Rhode Island only encompasses twelve hundred square miles, but
it has over four hundred miles of shoreline. 49 Providence harbor
was the essential element in Rhode Island's industrial develop-
ment of the late 1800s and early 1900s. The harbor is still com-
mercially active and the bay is utilized not only for commercial
fishing and quahogging, but also for recreation. Cities such as
Newport and Providence manifest the extensive wharving into the
bay and filling along the shoreline that has existed since at least
the time of the colonial statute in 1707.50 For over 200 years,
Rhode Island has been concerned with the preservation of its big-
gest natural asset: the bay.51
Despite all of these facts, it is interesting to note there have
been few public trust based actions with regard to wharving and
filling. This suggests that communities, citizens and legal intelli-
gentsia did not believe such activity alone constituted actionable
harm.5 2 With the salient importance of the bay, more authorita-
tive action surely would have been utilized if it was a valid means
of preserving the resource. The bay is a striking feature of the
state's geography, and the treatment of the public and private in-
terests in the bay is a striking feature of the state common law.
3. State Decisional Law
Rhode Island's tack through the course of public trust law may
be plotted by pinpointing three buoys: 1) dicta, 2) custom and us-
age, and 3) expectation.
The first mark is dicta. Prior to Chamber of Commerce, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had never directly ruled on the fun-
damental elements of public trust, but several cases contain dicta
49. 1996 Information Please Almanac 495 (Otto Johnson ed., 49th ed. 1996).
50. Mary Ferrazoli, Newport Harbor: Domain of the Rich, Ocean State Busi-
ness, June 20, 1988, at 14.
51. See supra text accompanying note 31.
52. See Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and Stonington S.S. Co.,
12 R.I. 348 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring).
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that provide valuable guidance. The most explicit language comes
from an 1895 per curiam decision of the court:
The establishment of a harbor line permits the riparian
owner to carry the upland or high-water mark out a certain
distance from the natural shore. Actual extension of the up-
land to the new line extinguishes all public rights within
it. . . Until actual filling out, the public rights exist as
before. 53
Though this passage is not part of the holding in Allen,54 it does
express the sentiment of the court that filling and extending the
upland creates a new high-water mark and extinguishes the public
rights between the old and new lines.
An earlier case which the Allen court cited three times in its
two column opinion contains additional elucidating dicta.55
Twenty years prior to Allen, the court stated:
The establishment of a harbor line, when so construed, means
that riparian proprietors within the line are at liberty to fill
and extend their land out to the line.... The part so reserved
is to be protected from encroachments. The rest is to be left
to be filled and occupied by the riparian proprietors.
•.. We think the establishment of a harbor line, if it is to
be construed as a conveyance, is to be construed as a convey-
ance which at least is subject to those rights [navigation and
fishing], until they are excluded by filling or wharfing out.56
The court went on to say "it is not necessary for us to go even so far
as that in the case at bar,"57 thus specifying the language as dicta.
However, the import of the passage is clear: rights of the public in
the bay may be subordinated to private interests in areas where
wharfing and filling predicate private ownership. When Allen was
before the court twenty years later, the court reiterated its dicta
and solidified it with a per curiam decision.58
53. Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 167 (R.I. 1895) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
54. The holding was that any inhabitant may take shellfish from the waters
and shores below the high-water mark without being guilty of trespass. Id.
55. Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875), cited with approval in Allen, 32 A. at
166-67.
56. Engs, 11 R.I. at 224 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Allen, 32 A. 166.
1996] RHODE ISLAND'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 193
Amidst the dicta in Engs, the court harkened upon the second
buoy of Rhode Island public trust law: custom and usage. The
court asserted:
[P]roprietors have been very freely permitted to erect
wharves, and even to make new land by filling the flats in
front of their land. We are not aware that the state has ever
laid claim to any wharf so built, or any land so made, unless
the cove lands filled by the city of Providence can be consid-
ered an exception. Our harbor line acts are to be construed in
the light of this doctrine and practice. 59
The definition of "custom and usage" is a practice of the people
which, by common adoption and unvarying habit has acquired the
force of a law with respect to the place or subject-matter to which it
relates. 60 The Rhode Island General Assembly has recognized
common usage as a means of modifying the interpretation of com-
mon law,61 and in public trust cases, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has repeatedly shown deference to the established customs
of the state.62
In the early case of Aborn v. Smith,63 the court decided the
issue of how much filling a littoral owner is entitled to do and
never questioned the generally accepted custom of allowing the fill-
ing to occur. 64 Several other early cases involved controversies
over the ownership of lots submerged at the time of platting, and
the court repeatedly recognized the practice of platting and convey-
ing submerged lots without raising the possibility of state owner-
ship of the lands.65 Additionally, the right to fill and wharf out has
59. Engs, 11 R.I. at 223-24.
60. Black's Law Dictionary 385 (6th ed. 1990).
61. See discussion supra part I.B.1.
62. See, e.g., Nugent v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1960) (recognizing long
established right to wharf out when not interfering with navigation or other ripa-
rian proprietors); Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and Stonington S.S.
Co., 12 R.I. 348 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring) (believing there has never been an
instance of the State interfering to prevent the common practice of wharfing and
filling); Simmons v. Mumford, 2 R.I. 172 (1852) (recognizing conveyances for lots
submerged at time of platting as customary).
63. 12 R.I. 370 (1879).
64. Id.
65. Providence Steam-Engine, 12 R.I. 348 (upholding the validity of lots and a
street platted below the high water mark); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330 (1876)
(deciding the impact of the establishment of a harbor line on previously platted
submerged lots); Simmons, 2 R.I. 172 (recognizing conveyances for lots submerged
at time of platting as customary).
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been a longstanding accepted custom, 66 and "it is believed there
has never been an instance of the State interfering to prevent it."67
When customs are followed for long periods of time, people
gain reasonable expectations in the status of their property inter-
ests; these expectations are the third mark. In Aborn, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court showed a willingness to preserve property
expectations by refusing to reapportion established fronts along
the harbor line even though "originally it would have been right
and expedient."68 Then, just after the turn of the century, the
court gave its most forceful defense of expectations:
To alter the rule after it has been so well settled and so long
acquiesced in would disturb rights of property which in many
cases have largely fixed the values given and received for lit-
toral estates, and this alone would forbid the court to make
such change without the clearest proof of error.69
This affirmation combined with the dicta and custom espoused in
other early cases substantiated people's expectations in the stabil-
ity of their property interests as private littoral owners. These rea-
sonable expectations were reinforced by the standing decisional
law in Rhode Island for nearly the entire twentieth century.70 This
ended when Hall v. Nascimento71 was decided in 1991.
C. Hall Leads to Consternation and Incertitude
Hall began as a minor dispute between two private property
owners over a 270-foot strip of land created by the dredging of
Mount Hope Bay.7 2 However, the decision handed down by the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island seemed to be a radical departure
66. Nugent, 161 A.2d at 805 (citing Providence Steam-Engine, 12 R.I. 348;
Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875)).
67. Providence Steam-Engine, 12 R.I. at 363 (Potter, J., concurring).
68. Aborn v. Smith, 12 R.I. 370, 372 (1879) (acknowledging the impracticabil-
ity of repartitioning the rights of littoral owners along the harbor line to be propor-
tionate with the length of coastline owned by each respective proprietor).
69. Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805, 808 (R.I. 1901) (permitting the continuance
of the longstanding custom of gathering seaweed stranded on the shore).
70. In addition, the United States Supreme Court recently affirmed "the im-
portance of honoring reasonable expectations in property interests." Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482 (1988) (permitting the reclamation of
lands by the state only after concluding that the contrary expectations of the pri-
vate land owners were not reasonable in light of Mississippi law) (emphasis
added).
71. 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991).
72. Id. at 875.
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from the course of the state's public trust law. The following lan-
guage from the case is disconcerting:
It is well settled in Rhode Island that pursuant to the public
trust doctrine the State maintains title in fee to all soil within
its boundaries that lies below the high-water mark, and it
holds such land in trust for the use of the public....
Such filled or submerged land owned in fee by the State
and subject to the public trust doctrine may be conveyed by
the State to a private individual by way of legislative grant,
provided the effect of the transfer is not inconsistent with the
precepts of the public trust doctrine.
.. [W]e find that defendants continue to maintain rights
in that area as long as their use of the area is not inconsistent
with the public trust. The defendants' rights, however, are
subservient to the State's rights in the property because the
State holds title in fee subject to the public trust doctrine. 73
In one page of the opinion, the court seemed to wash away the
dicta, custom and usage, and reasonable expectations that had
been the mainstay of public trust in Rhode Island for over a
century.
The decision is disturbing because the court looked to many of
the same cases herein discussed to reach these conclusions. 74
While the court was willing to acknowledge some rights adhering
in the littoral owners, the repeated emphasis was on the para-
mount rights of the state as trustee. The court characterized the
defendants' rights as "subservient",75 and cited Carr v. Carpenter76
for the proposition that littoral owners only "'enjoy what remains
of the rights and privileges in the soil beyond their strict boundary
lines, after giving to the public the full enjoyment of their
rights.'"77 Additionally, the court stated twice that it would only
validate rights to submerged lands in private owners when the ef-
73. Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
74. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892); State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982); Nugent v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802
(R.I. 1960); Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I.
1895); Bailey v. Burges, 11 R.I. 330 (1876); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875)).
75. Id.
76. 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901).
77. Hall, 594 A.2d at 877 (quoting Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805, 805 (R.I.
1901)).
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fect is not inconsistent with the public trust.78 This condition is
discomfiting because it begs the question of what constitutes an
encroachment inconsistent with the public trust. Hall is even
more disconcerting because the case appears to dramatically alter
Rhode Island's interpretation of the scope of the public trust
doctrine.
The outcome of Hall rippled through the real estate commu-
nity and mobilized a gamut of forces: some seeking to maximize
and others to minimize the effect of the opinion.79 The decision
beleaguered title companies because they were unsure how to react
to the decision.80 The consequences were potentially devastating
because billions of dollars in property could be affected. 81
In an attempt to quiet title to filled lands throughout the state,
and to determine the state of title to certain parcels possibly sub-
ject to reclamation under the Hall interpretation of the public trust
78. Id.
79. Friends of the Waterfront became active to find ways the public could ben-
efit, such as gaining greater access to the water and imposing a moratorium on all
coastal building until a final determination of the ownership of the lands was es-
tablished. The General Assembly created a legislative task force to investigate
various options the state could pursue such as reclaiming the filled lands and then
leasing the land back to the current occupants. In the private sector, downtown
businesses such as Fleet National Bank, Johnson & Wales University, Capital
Properties, Inc., Citizens Savings Bank and Rhode Island Hospital Trust National
Bank examined the potential impact of the decision and investigated alternative
solutions from a class action suit to an action for declaratory judgment. Many
businesses were willing to participate in a lawsuit, despite the possibility that
their title to the property could be revoked by an unfavorable outcome. Interview
with John M. Boehnert, Esq., Plaintiff's Attorney in Chamber of Commerce case, in
Providence, R.I. (Nov. 7, 1995).
80. The validity of all titles composed wholly or partially of filled land became
uncertain. It was unclear how broadly the holding would be interpreted and how
actively the state would attempt to reassert its public trust rights. Title insurance
companies faced higher risks of loss, and they would potentially deny coverage
altogether for certain parcels. Telephone Interview with Michael B. Mellion,
Rhode Island State Counsel, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Dec.
19, 1995).
81. For instance, the majority of downtown Providence, including the business
district, lies on filled land. If parcels composed of filled land could revert back to
the state because of an inappropriate alienation of the public trust, title to those
parcels would become practically unmarketable. To ensure the security of their
funds, most banks will not grant mortgages unless the property is covered by title
insurance. But the title companies would not be able to guarantee coverage if the
state had the power to reacquire the filled lands. Thus, it would be much harder
for property to be sold because banks would not be willing to finance the transac-
tions. Id.
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doctrine, a declaratory judgment action was brought against the
state in Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State.8 2
II. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Two BY Two THEY BOARD IN SEARCH OF SOLID GROUND
Four owners of filled land properties brought a declaratory
judgment action against the State for a determination of the un-
derlying fee.83 Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) and the
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce were two plaintiffs with
ownership interests in parcels located within an area known as the
"Cove Lands."8 4 The Cove Lands were conveyed to the city of Prov-
idence by a grant from the state duly authorized by an act of the
General Assembly, and the two Cove Land plaintiffs received title
from the city of Providence via subsequent recorded deeds.85 Both
of these plaintiffs are legislatively chartered, non-profit organiza-
tions which suggests they operate generally to benefit the public.8 6
Neither of the two Cove Lands parcels currently borders on tidal
water.87
Narragansett Electric Company and the Providence Gas Com-
pany were two plaintiffs with ownership interests in harbor line
parcels.88 Both abut the current harbor line, and neither ever re-
ceived an express legislative grant to fill to that line.89 These
plaintiffs are private, profit seeking corporations, but they also
confer substantial benefits upon the public.90
The four plaintiffs were not chosen because they confer public
benefits, 9 1 but this common attribute may have facilitated a ruling
in their favor. A declaratory judgment was sought because it
82. 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995).
83. Id. at 1039.
84. Id. The Great Salt Cove was a tidal saltwater cove encompassing several
hundred acres until it was completely filled in by 1892. It included a major portion
of downtown Providence.
85. Id. at 1040.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1041.
89. Id. The gas company did receive some permits for filling issued by the
Rhode Island Board of Harbor Commissioners, but these permits were not
equivalent to legislative grants or conveyances. Id.
90. Id.
91. Interview with John M. Boehnert, Esq., Attorney for the Plaintiffs, in
Providence, R.I. (Nov. 7, 1995).
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seemed to be the most effective and efficient way to resolve the
community-wide dilemma.92 The hope was that a satisfactory
judgment would be broad enough to quiet title to other similarly
situated parcels, or even better, that a superlative judgment would
create a broad standard for settling nearly every public trust case
that may arise in the state.93 The following pages seek to demon-
strate that the Chamber of Commerce decision meets that superla-
tive standard. The holding provides the definitive statement
forever quieting title to all Cove Lands parcels in the private rec-
ord owners. 94 As for the harbor line parcels, the court specifically
limited its holding to the two plaintiffs. 95 However, the court did
devise a positive two-pronged test for establishing title in other fil-
led lands.96
III. CoVE LANDS AND HARBOR LINES STEER RHODE ISLAND TO A
TEST FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC TRUST
In an attempt to balance individual freedoms with public in-
terests, states have placed themselves all along the spectrum re-
garding alienation of lands subject to the public trust. Some
seemingly forbid alienation under any circumstances. 97 Others al-
low alienation only under express grants supported by manifest
legislative intentions. 98 Still others allow complete relinquish-
92. Id. Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 9-24-25, a petition and
agreed statement of facts was filed with the superior court for certification to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-25 (1985).
93. Interview with John M. Boehnert, Esq., Attorney for the Plaintiffs, in
Providence, R.I. (Nov. 7, 1995).
94. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1040-
41 (R.I. 1995).
95. Id. at 1039.
96. Id. at 1044.
97. Mobile Transp. Co. v. City of Mobile, 44 So. 976, 978 (Ala. 1907) ("The
shore and bed of a navigable stream being strictly trust property, . . . are as ina-
lienable and as incapable of being severed from public use as the streets in a city
.... "); State v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916) ("[T]he title to
the subaqueous soil is held by the state as trustee for the public, and that nothing
can be done by him [the littoral owner] that will destroy or weaken the rights of
the beneficiaries of the trust estate ... An individual may abandon his private
property, but a public trustee cannot abandon public property."), cited with ap-
proval in Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio 1979).
98. State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Vt. 1989) ("intent to
abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied"); CWC Fisheries, Inc. v.
Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1988) ("[Tlhe legislature's intent to so convey
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ment of filled land even though the filling was unauthorized. 99
Chamber of Commerce gave the Rhode Island Supreme Court an
opportunity to solidify the state's position on the spectrum.
The court declared that Rhode Island's public trust doctrine is
"pervasively embedded in American jurisprudence." 00 The court
began its inquiry by stating, "Rhode Island decisional law and this
court have never cast aside the public-trust doctrine. As a matter
of fact, this court has consistently cited federal decisions that em-
brace this well-articulated body of general law." 1 1 The Chamber
of Commerce decision is consistent with the doctrine's past treat-
ment in Rhode Island, and its effect will govern the future of public
trust in Rhode Island.
The effect will be explained by an analysis of the three classes
of potential public trust lands in Rhode Island: 1) lands made by
the filling of the Great Salt Cove, i.e., the Cove Lands, 2) lands
made by filling to a harbor line, and 3) other lands made by filling
where no harbor line is involved.
A. Class 1. The Cove Lands: Necessity and Appropriateness of
Grant Validates the Conveyance Forever Vesting Fee Simple
in the Private Record Holders
The most straightforward way to extinguish the public trust is
by express legislative grants of fee simple absolute.' 0 2 While some
it must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the legislation authorizing
the transfer.").
99. See Opinion of Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981) (extin-
guishing public trust rights in presently landlocked land valueless for public trust
purposes); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362
(Cal. 1980) (affirming private property interests in tidelands rendered substan-
tially valueless for public trust purposes).
100. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042
(R.I. 1995).
101. Id. See, e.g., Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991) (citing Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); State v. Ibbison, 448
A.2d 728, 731 (R.I. 1982) (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842)); City of
Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307, (R.I. 1906) (citing Shively, 152 U.S. 1; Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. 387).
102. But legislative grants do not automatically extinguish the trust, because
the grant could be invalidated by the judiciary. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (in-
validating the legislative grant to the railroad because of egregious disregard of
the public interest); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606
P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (balancing interests at stake to determine if part or all of an
1870 act conveying tidelands should be invalidated). See also Wilkinson, supra
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limitations remain on the types and extent of the grants, the prin-
ciple is well established in Rhode Island and other jurisdictions
that valid legislative state grants extinguish the public trust.10 3
Even Hall v. Nascimento acknowledged that land owned in fee by
the state as trustee could be deeded to individuals by way of legis-
lative grant, provided "the transfer is not inconsistent with the
precepts of the public trust doctrine." 10 4
The court in Chamber of Commerce laid out four reasons why
the Cove Lands Grant 0 5 was a necessary and appropriate legisla-
tive grant: 1) supposed sanitary and hydraulic reasons directed fill-
ing in the cove, 2) unique circumstances surrounding railroad
purposes required some filling of the cove, 3) all littoral rights to
the cove had been extinguished by the laying out of public streets
along the boundaries of the cove and 4) "the General Assembly in
1867 revoked all grants of any portions of the Cove Lands that had
not been accepted and the conditions of which had not been ful-
filled."' 0 6 These four reasons, especially the last which limited the
extent of the grant to those portions used to promote the purpose of
the grant, distinguish the Cove Lands Grant from the sweeping
grant in Illinois Central.10 7 In Illinois Central, the Court invali-
dated the grant because it was overly broad, and the legislature
had apparently made the grant without properly considering the
note 9, at 464 (declaring the traditional trust allows states wide latitude, but the
states are federally prohibited from abrogating the public trust entirely). How-
ever, when there is a rational basis for the legislative grant and the intention to
dissolve the public's rights in the land is evidenced, then the grant should be sanc-
tioned by the courts. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393
N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980). But cf. State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt.
1989) (holding that the railroad's title acquired by a legislative grant was only a
fee simple subject to condition subsequent because of lack of explicit legislative
intent to grant a fee simple absolute).
103. City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906). See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892); Boston Waterfront, 393 N.E.2d 356.
104. Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991). This offers leeway for
some grants, but begs the question of whether the grants are consistent with the
precepts of public trust.
105. The grant conveyed title from the State of Rhode Island to the City of
Providence by deed recorded in 1870. This transfer was authorized by a General
Assembly Resolution. Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040. See 1870 R.I. Acts
and Resolves 213 (Addendum).
106. Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040.
107. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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interests of the public.108 In Chamber of Commerce, the four rea-
sons explicitly stated show the Cove Lands Grant was an appropri-
ate, necessary and calculated action by the General Assembly; it
was a valid, express legislative grant. 10 9 Therefore, the record ti-
tleholder of any parcel within the bounds of that grant, including
the plaintiffs RISD and Chamber of Commerce, holds title in fee
simple absolute. 110
Other nearby jurisdictions have held that even when an ex-
press legislative grant is given, the recipient does not receive fee
simple absolute.' These jurisdictions focus on the paramount
rights of the public to the lands and construe the grants strictly in
favor of the state. This alternate solution raises a variety of differ-
ent concerns ranging from determining what uses are considered
to be in the public interest 12 to what constitutes a breach of the
conditions subsequent. 1 3 Most significantly, owners of land sub-
ject to conditions subsequent do not enjoy the freedom to use or
dispose of their property as they desire. This causes the land to be
far less valuable because of the state's superior right to reclaim the
land upon breach of the conditions subsequent.
But this alternative is not instructive as to the past, present or
future cases in Rhode Island. The crucial dogma is to remain con-
sistent with the distinctive law of Rhode Island, including the
dicta, customs and expectations. 1 4 Vermont and Massachusetts
have had several occasions to interpret the public trust, but their
development of the doctrine has been far different from Rhode Is-
land's.11 5 Traditionally, Rhode Island has embraced the principle
108. Id.
109. Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1040.
110. Id. at 1040-41.
111. State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989) (determining the
fee still subject to a condition subsequent); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523
F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that the fee can only be held by the sover-
eign); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
1979) (granting lands to private individuals transfers fee simple subject to condi-
tion subsequent).
112. For a discussion of the uses which could be attached to the contemporary
public trust doctrine, see Marc J. Hershman, A Word of Caution: The Public Trust
Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management, 8 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 237, 245-47 (1993).
113. Central Vermont, 571 A.2d 1128.
114. See supra part I.B.3.
115. For example, Vermont has never espoused the granting of submerged par-
cels for purposes of aiding commerce or promoting the public interest. Central Ver-
mont, 571 A.2d at 1133. Massachusetts has held that the lands may only be
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that public lands may be alienated as long as they are not "appro-
priated by, or conferred upon, private individuals for purely pri-
vate benefit."116 In comparison to the nearby states, Rhode Island
allows lands to be alienated by the state more liberally. Vesting
fee simple absolute in all.Cove Land parcels is an example of the
liberal alienation, and the court's resolution of the harbor line par-
cels is illustrative of its willingness to further deflate the public
trust doctrine as a preserver of natural resources.
B. Class 2. The Harbor Line Parcels: To A Certain Extent,
Filling Has Implicit Approval
The harbor line plaintiffs did not receive express legislative
grants to fill in front of their lands. 117 The gas and electric com-
pany each filled up to, but not beyond established harbor lines."38
Although there were no legislative grants or conveyances of these
filled lands, the court examined state case law and made the logi-
cal inference necessary to establish title in fee simple absolute in
the plaintiffs. 11 9
When the filling of these parcels occurred, the filled land did
not extend beyond the established harbor line seaward of the prop-
erty, and the lands do not extend beyond the harbor line as it ex-
ists today.1 20 This fact alone, by the very definition of a harbor
line, gives credence to the court's ruling that the public trust does
not protect those lands.12' If the public trust doctrine is limited by
the policies from which it originated, viz., to prohibit interference
with navigation, commerce and fishing, then all filled lands up to
but not beyond a harbor line are a priori outside the public trust.
granted to the private sector as fee simple subject to condition subsequent and only
when the private benefits are merely incidental to the promotion of a public pur-
pose. See Boston Waterfront, 393 N.E.2d 356; Opinion of Justices to Senate, 424
N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981).
116. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042
(R.I. 1995).




121. See Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210, 224 (1875) ("A harbor line is in fact
what it purports to be, the line of a harbor. It marks the boundary of a certain part
of the public waters which is reserved for a harbor. . . . Its establishment is
equivalent to a legislative declaration that navigation will not be straitened [sic] or
obstructed by any such filling out.").
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"The harbor lines were a legislative determination ... that en-
croachment on the waters to the harbor line would not constitute
interference with fishery, commerce, or navigation."122
The harbor line holding is fortified by the Court's reasoning in
Illinois Central which establishes the basic principle for evaluating
public trust cases:
The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promot-
ing the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining. 123
Since the Court in Illinois Central held the legislative grant to the
railroad invalid, many subsequent litigants have used the decision
to support the thesis that the public trust may not be extin-
guished. 124 But in fact, the holding is much more limited because
the grant was held invalid to the extent it cut off the city's access to
Lake Michigan and gave a private party unfettered control of the
entire waterfront of Chicago. 125
The phrase "substantial impairment" in Illinois Central sets
the standard from which may spring exceptions to traditional pub-
lic trust; this phrase is used no less than three times throughout
the opinion. 126 Typically, the public interests that cannot be sub-
stantially impaired are the ancient rights to use the waters for
fishing, navigation and commerce; therefore, the line for substan-
tial impairment may be drawn at the level of navigability. 127 In
Illinois Central, the Court restored title in the bed of Lake Michi-
gan to the state, but as for parcels that had been improved with
piers, the case was remanded for a determination of the points at
which the line of navigability was broached, "and to affirm the title
and possession of the company if they do not extend beyond such
point, and, if they do extend beyond such point, to order the abate-
ment and removal of the excess." 128 The necessary implication of
122. Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044.
123. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892) (emphasis added).
124. E.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356
(Mass. 1979); State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
125. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454-55.
126. Id. at 435, 452-53.
127. See id. This is consistent with the policy of the rights being associated
with the water more than with the land. See supra pp. 184-86.
128. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 464-65.
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this argument is that lands filled to a harbor line, i.e., a preestab-
lished and legislatively approved line demarcating navigable wa-
ters, are not a substantial impairment of the public interest. This
remains true whether the lands were filled in accordance with the
express approval or mere acquiescence of the legislature. Quieting
title in fee simple absolute in the gas and electric companies was
analytically correct because of the prior existence of the harbor
line.
Having resolved the specific issues presented by each plaintiff,
the Chamber of Commerce court could have ended its inquiry at
this point. Instead, the court propounded a two part test to be ap-
plied to establish ownership rights in any filled tidal lands. 129
C. Class 3. Other Lands Covered by The Two-Part Test
The test reads:
A littoral owner who fills along his or her shore line, whether
to a harbor line or otherwise, with the acquiescence or the
express or implied approval of the state and improves upon
the land in justifiable reliance on the approval, would be able
to establish title to that land that is free and clear.130
This test goes beyond what was required to resolve the issues
before the court in Chamber of Commerce, and it goes beyond what
other jurisdictions have been willing to do, but it does not go be-
yond the dialectic of Rhode Island public trust law. A positive test
was needed to clarify the murkiness created by Hall, and the test
is a logical extension from the court's holding regarding the harbor
line parcels.
The same reasoning utilized to analyze the harbor line parcels
justifies the Chamber of Commerce test. The test extends the prin-
ciple of permitting alienation of lands within certain limits ap-
proved by the state, such as harbor lines, but the extension does
not violate the logic. A parcel of filled tidal lands "whether to a
harbor line or otherwise" may satisfy the test.131 The insertion of
this phrase acts as a limitation because courts could apply the test
more broadly if the phrase were left out completely. However, the
phrase also acts as an extension from the holding regarding the
harbor line parcels because it allows the test to be applied to other
129. Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044.
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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parcels. The standard is made even more expansive by allowing
the approval of the state to be express, implied or a mere acquies-
cence.' 3 2 But even with these two flexible notions, the test pro-
vides solid grounds for evaluating public trust rights, and two
distinct arguments shore the test's validity: one is an ancient pillar
grounded in traditional public trust and the other is a hoist from
contemporary public trust theory.
1. Rhode Island's Case Law: A Stalwart Pillar
The pillar supporting the Chamber of Commerce test is the un-
derlying policy from which Rhode Island public trust evolved. The
Sovereign holds the lands as trustee to ensure that public interests
in the lands are protected. 133 The rights Rhode Island has long
recognized as protected were those of fishing,' 34 commerce and
navigation.13 5 Whenever these rights have not been substantially
impaired, ipso facto there has been no violation of the public trust.
The Chamber of Commerce test is the means for determining the
existence of a substantial impairment. When a parcel satisfies
both prongs of the test, then there is no substantial impairment.
The proviso attached to the test expresses further textual sup-
port for this result. The proviso reads that one may only "become
owner in fee-simple absolute provided that the littoral owner has
not created any interference with the public-trust rights of fishery,
commerce, and navigation." 3 6 The proviso is not an additional
part of the test, but merely an explicit recitation of the test's pur-
pose. The purpose is to protect the unextended triad of rights
132. Id.
133. See supra pp. 184-85.
134. Interpreted broadly to include the indigenous harvesting of quahogs and
gathering of seaweed. See supra notes 47-48.
135. Nugent v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1960) (recognizing right to wharf out
without interfering with navigation); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Horgan, 56 A.
179 (R.I. 1903) (showing the intent of the Resolution of 1707 was to foster com-
merce); Carr v. Carpenter, 48 A. 805 (R.I. 1901) (verifying right to collect seaweed
on the shore); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895) (noting rights to clamming and
right to wharf provided navigation not impeded); Clarke v. City of Providence, 15
A. 763 (R.I. 1888) (acknowledging rights of clamming but affirming that the rights
and privileges preserved in article I, section 17 do not create any new rights not
held prior to the constitution); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875) (protecting flow
of commerce and navigation by adherence to harbor lines).
136. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1044
(R.I. 1995).
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which attached at common law and have always been the mainstay
of Rhode Island's public trust doctrine. 137
A recent Vermont case 138 with similar facts to Chamber of
Commerce, suggests this reasoning is flawed by reaching an en-
tirely opposite result, but it is one of the most "regressive" 39 public
trust cases. The State of Vermont and City of Burlington peti-
tioned for a declaratory judgment to divest the railroad of filled
lands it had acquired pursuant to an 1827 Act.1 40 The railroad had
filled and improved the land, using it for railroad purposes for
more than a century, but when it tried to sell the property the state
brought an action claiming the public trust had not been
extinguished.' 4 '
Vermont's Constitution has a provision 142 similar to Rhode Is-
land's article I, section 17, which "underscores the early emphasis
placed upon the public interest in Vermont's navigable waters."' 43
But the case history in Vermont "stands for the proposition that
the legislature cannot grant rights in public trust property for pri-
vate purposes. "144 The Vermont Supreme Court admits that
grants of submerged parcels for purposes of aiding commerce or
promoting the public interest were recognized by the Court in Illi-
nois Central as an exception "to the general rule against legislative
alienation of trust property." 45 But the Vermont Supreme Court
137. E.g., Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and Stonington S.S. Co.,
12 R.I. 348 (1879) (Potter, J., concurring) (noting that not all tide lands are subject
to the trust); City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906) (clarifying that
public trust rights have been altered by local custom). See also Clarke v. City of
Providence, 15 A. 763 (R.I. 1888) (lowering the criterion further by allowing poten-
tial exceptions to even these protected rights). See supra part I.B.
138. State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
139. Hershman, supra note 112, at 242.
140. Central Vermont, 571 A.2d at 1129.
141. Id.
142. Vt. Const. ch. II, § 67 ("The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in
seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not
inclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private
property) under proper regulations, to be made and provided by the General
Assembly.").
143. Central Vermont, 571 A.2d at 1131.
144. Id. (citing Hazen v. Perkins, 105 A. 249, 251 (Vt. 1918) ("the General As-
sembly cannot grant to private persons for private purposes")). See also In re Lake
Seymour, 91 A.2d 813, 818 (Vt. 1952) (no right to control water level of lake can be
granted to private persons for private purposes); State v. Malmquist, 40 A.2d 534,
540 (Vt. 1944) (same).
145. Central Vermont, 571 A.2d at 1133.
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states unequivocally that this exception has "never been espoused
by this Court."146 This strict interpretation leads the court to con-
clude that the preservation of the public interest must be served by
granting the railroad fee simple subject to the condition subse-
quent that it be used for the public purposes intended at the time
of the grant. 147 This may be a proper interpretation of Vermont's
public trust law and it retains greater state control over tidal
lands; but it severely limits private proprietors' freedom to control
the uses of their own lands.
In stark contrast, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has con-
sistently adhered to the exception for aiding commerce and other-
wise promoting the public interest.148 Even in the early cases, the
complainants "concede[d] that the general assembly has power to
authorize such encroachments upon the tide-waters, where they
are made in the interest of navigation, for the erection of wharves,
or are affected for other public purposes." 149 The court went on to
say "there is nothing in the acts, so far as we are aware, imposing
any such limit; and it is well known, as a matter of fact, that no
such limit has been observed." 5 0
The more recent case of Nugent v. Vallone says, "[ilndeed it
appears to have been long recognized in this state that this right to
wharf out is a common-law right which, in the absence of statute to
the contrary, will not be denied, provided that the exercise thereof
does not interfere with navigation .... "1-51 The Nugent opinion
clarifies the limited purpose of the public trust doctrine in Rhode
Island: "[The state] holds such title not as a proprietor but only in
trust for the public to preserve their rights of fishery, navigation
and commerce in such waters."15 2 When these itemized rights
have not been substantially impaired, Rhode Island's judiciary has
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1135.
148. See supra note 135.
149. Clarke v. City of Providence, 15 A. 763, 766 (R.I. 1888).
150. Id.
151. 161 A.2d 802, 805 (R.I. 1960). See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I.
1895); Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence and Stonington S.S. Co., 12 R.I.
348 (1879); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
152. Nugent, 161 A.2d at 805. But cf. Lazarus, supra note 5, at 647-50 (explain-
ing the public trust doctrine's expansion and adaptability to broader environmen-
tal concerns such as aesthetics and recreation); Reed, supra note 5, at 116
(approving the trend in some states to broaden the applicability of public trust to
inland lakes and bays and even mountain streams).
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refused to allow the public trust doctrine to be utilized to adversely
affect the title of the private littoral owner. This hallowed pillar
anchors the Chamber of Commerce test in Rhode Island public
trust law.
2. A Modern Trend Hoists Chamber of Commerce By Supplying
Support for Unstated Fundamental Principles
The innovative test is buttressed by one vein of the progressive
movement in modern trust law. The underlying current in Cham-
ber of Commerce reveals the court's disposition to narrow the scope
of the traditional public trust in favor of a more pragmatic ap-
proach to filled tidal lands. Other jurisdictions have begun to sub-
merge the public trust doctrine, and while none has pronounced
such a succinct and positive test, they have expressed the entailed
policies in more detail. 153
In 1980, the California Supreme Court overturned prece-
dent-54 that had stood for more than sixty years in favor of a more
modern approach:
We choose, instead, an intermediate course: the appropriate
resolution is to balance the interests of the public in tidelands
conveyed pursuant to the 1870 act against those of the land-
owners who hold property under these conveyances. In the
harmonizing of these claims, the principle we apply is that
the interests of the public are paramount in property that is
still physically adaptable for trust uses, whereas the interests
of the grantees and their successors should prevail insofar as
the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for
those purposes. 155
The court succumbed to realism, and balanced external factors and
competing interests against the inherent rights secured by the
public trust. Within a year of this watershed decision in Califor-
nia, advisory opinions were handed down in Maine 56 and Massa-
153. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal.
1980); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981); Opinion of the Justices,
424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981).
154. Berkeley, 606 P.2d 362 (overturning Knudson v. Kearney, 152 P. 541 (Cal.
1915) and Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. City of Alameda, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1968)).
155. Id. at 373.
156. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).
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chusetts 157 agreeing with and further rationalizing this modern
trend. 158
The Maine advisory opinion, coming within 70 days of the
opinion of Massachusetts, referred to that opinion favorably and
proceeded to throw the strict principles of the ancient doctrine
overboard. The court recognized the legislature's power to termi-
nate the public trust because "[i]n dealing with public trust proper-
ties, the standard of reasonableness must change as the needs of
society change." 15 9 The justices articulated- five factors that com-
bined to show it was within the power of the legislature to pass an
act abdicating the public trust in vast amounts of lands once sub-
ject to tidal flows: 1) the assurance that commercial and other ac-
tivity may go forward unimpaired, 2) the filled lands are now
substantially valueless for public trust uses, 3) the use of remain-
ing intertidal and submerged lands would not be impaired, 4) the
expectations of private ownership developed by private parties
over long periods and 5) the state's retention of its broad regula-
tory authority over the parcels. 160 Although these factors are an-
nounced in support of an express legislative act to grant lands
within the public trust, they all apply with equal force to implied
state approval and even mere state acquiescence. Each factor of-
fers an independent basis for modernizing the public trust doctrine
by narrowing its applicability, and each factor applies to filled land
whether acquired by express, implied or acquiesced approval.
Immediately after its discussion of these factors, the Maine
court cited Illinois Central where "the Court specifically and re-
peatedly stated that a grant under other circumstances might be
valid-for example, where public rights in adjacent lands and wa-
ters were in no way impaired."' 6 ' The court would not have cited
Illinois Central at this juncture unless it believed its decision was
within the boundaries erected by that seminal case. Rhode Island,
157. Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 1981).
158. In each instance, the advisory opinions were sought because the legisla-
ture was considering a bill to extinguish the public trust in vast areas of filled
land. This is one way states have tried to resolve conflicts without extensive litiga-
tion. See 1983 Mass. Acts ch. 598, §§ 20-27; 1986 Mass. Acts ch. 348. In 1992,
following the decision in Hall v. Nascimento, a bill to clarify public trust rights was
considered and rejected by the Rhode Island General Assembly. H.R. 0262A, Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 1992).
159. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981).
160. Id. at 607-08.
161. Id. at 609.
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a state that has numerously and consistently cited Illinois Central
as persuasive authority, has avowed the Chamber of Commerce
test which is substantiated by the same factors and arguments set
forth in the Maine advisory opinion.
The Massachusetts advisory opinion attempts to create a stan-
dard for weighing the key factors by saying, "where there may be
benefits to private parties, those private benefits must not be pri-
mary but merely incidental to the achievement of the public pur-
pose."162 This offers some guidance as to which interests will be
favored, but the ambiguous and ever-expanding definition of "pub-
lic purpose" impairs the desired accuracy of predicting public trust
cases.163
The states of Maine, Massachusetts and California have ar-
ticulated the fact that modern public trust cases require a balanc-
ing of interests. Yet this alone is not sufficient to predict which
interests will be deemed superior when conflicts arise because
there is little guidance for the balancing procedure. In contrast,
the Chamber of Commerce test is a mechanical method for predict-
ing outcomes in public trust cases. The test provides some bright
lines for determining when private interests are sufficient to out-
weigh the public interests, while remaining flexible enough to
adapt to extenuating circumstances. When an owner fills land
with the implied approval of the state and subsequently improves
upon the land, it is clear that she may establish title to the filled
land in fee simple absolute in herself.164 But when there is a ques-
tion of whether the state has acquiesced in the filling of the lands,
there is room to maneuver the answer to maximize the utility of
the competing interests.
The factors set forth in the modern analysis of the other states
herein discussed supports the general principle of creating a stan-
dard test for resolving public trust cases. While other states have
not yet adopted a clear standard, Rhode Island has been able to
162. Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100 (Mass. 1981).
163. Id. at 1110-11 (Liacos, J. and Abrams, J., dissenting).
164. While the test does provide unequivocally for the land to be entirely freed
from the public trust, the real estate industry has not yet determined the practical
procedures requisite for establishing title in fee simple absolute in the private
owners. The test clearly sets forth the elements that must be shown in order to
quiet title, but title companies have yet to formalize the criteria for satisfying the
test in practice. Telephone Interview with Michael B. Mellion, Rhode Island State
Counsel, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Dec. 19, 1995).
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deduce a methodical test from the consistent decisional law rulings
on classes of parcels with shared distinctive attributes.
CONCLUSION
In addition to establishing title for the four plaintiffs, Cham-
ber of Commerce pronounced a test for determining the state of ti-
tle in filled lands of any class. 165 The two elements of the test,
filling along the shore with the acquiescence or express or implied
approval of the state and then improving the filled land, are flexi-
ble enough to handle unique cases which may arise. And yet, they
are firm enough to predict accurately the ownership of the vast ma-
jority of filled lands. When the test is applied to an improved par-
cel within the Cove Lands, fee simple absolute will be vested in the
private party; the Cove Land parcels were part of an express grant
and have been substantially improved upon for over one hundred
years. When the test is applied to an improved parcel filled to a
harbor line, fee simple absolute will likely vest in the private party
because a harbor line is an implied approval from the state. The
harbor line plaintiffs in Chamber of Commerce met both prongs
and were vested with fee simple absolute because they had tacit
approval to fill to the harbor line, and they had substantially im-
proved upon the parcels for many years. 166 When the test is ap-
plied to an improved parcel filled without the benefit of a harbor
line and without express legislative authorization, the private
party will have to show implied approval or state acquiescence via
other means, in order to satisfy the first prong.
The precise alternative means which will be sufficient to sat-
isfy a showing of state acquiescence has not yet been determined,
but at least littoral owners know the standard they must achieve
in order to establish fee simple.
Hall is an example of a case that fails the first prong because
the filling was not to a harbor line, and it was not expressly author-
ized.' 6 7 Even if Hall could satisfy the first prong by showing that
the permits from the Rhode Island Department of Public Works,
165. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1044
(R.I. 1995).
166. Id. at 1043-44.
167. Id. at 1043.
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Division of Harbors and Rivers establish state acquiescence, 16
Hall would still fail the test. Hall does not satisfy the second
prong because the filled land was left as open space and never im-
proved upon.169 The test unequivocally confirms the result
reached in Hall, but shuns the reasoning of that opinion.
Other states may have more difficulty developing and justify-
ing the implementation of similar methodical tests because they
lack the special circumstances which exist in Rhode Island. The
Chamber of Commerce test derives legitimacy from its consistency
with the long history of public trust in Rhode Island, and its com-
patibility with contemporary public trust theory. The test shores
the limits of Rhode Island's public trust doctrine with clarity, va-
lidity and reliability.
Matthew D. Slepkow
168. Id. This may be a difficult argument since the filling was more than five
times as extensive as authorized by the permit. Id.
169. Id.
